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Abstract. This addendum contains further details about the two case
studies reported in our paper Combined Assessment of Software Safety
and Security Requirements — An industrial evaluation of the CHASSIS
method.
1 The Radio Systems Case
1.1 Participants
In this case the two participants took part in all the activities. We will refer to
them as Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier
(participants in case 1, person 1 and 2).
Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier had
25 and 15 years of working experience from the IT industry. They were both
experienced in system modeling and safety assessments, but had no practical
experience with the hazard and operability study (HAZOP) method. They had
both tried modeling with UML and conducting security assessments, but were
not experienced.
1.2 Advance-prepared UC and feedback on T-UC
Before the evaluation, the first author created D-UC, T-UC and SD of a typical
radio system used in ATM, based on his experiences with ATM and radio sys-
tems. The D-UC included an air-traffic control officer as an actor and use cases
of transmit and receive radio message. These were further described by a T-UC.
A SD was created prior to the meeting to show the components involved in the
transmission of a radio message.
We presented the advance-prepared D-UC and T-UC to collect feedback on
the realism of our descriptions. The D-UC and T-UC were compared to the
system developed by the company, in order to change incorrect parts. We had also
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Name Transmit radio message
Iteration 1
Summary An air-traffic control officer is transmitting a radio message to
an aircraft
Basic path bp1. Pushed transmit button activates radio client modulation
bp2. Radio client records information
bp2.1. Radio client transforms voice to digital signal (packets)
bp2.2. Radio client sets frequency to transmit on
bp3. Radio client sends packets to radio server
bp4. Radio server identifies frequency to send on
bp5. Radio server sends packets to correct radio
bp6. Radio converts to AM (amplitude modulated) signal and
sends to the antenna
Alternative paths ap1. Replaces bp3,4,5: Radio client sends directly sends to radio
ap2. Replaces bp3,4,5: Has analog interface to the channel
(would be done with other boxes)
Exception paths ep1. Affects all bps. Failure in network, will not have any com-
munication. Dual network.
Extension points
Triggers tr1. Transmitter button pushed
Assumptions as1. Systems work as expected
as2. If failure of system, air-traffic control officer will be made
aware of it. Side tone.
Preconditions preC1. Setting the correct frequency
preC2. Radio channel is free for communication
Postconditions postC1. Radio message was sent to antenna.
Related business
rules
Authors Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-
RadioSystemsSupplier
Date 27.03.2012
Table 1. A T-UC describing the transmit radio message from the RadioSystems case.
prepared three SDs in advance, but did not prioritize the walkthrough of these
with the participants. This was because the participants were able to correct the
T-UC in such a way that the SDs could easily be modified accordingly.
D-UC: The D-UC was just briefly shown to the participants, and they did not
have any particular comments to it.
T-UC: There was a comment in the T-UC on the terminology used, i.e., they
would use the term radio server instead of radio central. They did also comment
that the radio system would communicate with a radio mast. Another comment
was that the radio mast broadcasts an analog signal and that the conversion
from digital to analog signal would have to be done before the radio mast was
broadcasting the analog signal. Except from these few corrections, they found
the basic path description as a realistic example of how their system would work.
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During the introduction, we completed the alternative path, the exception
path, assumptions, pre- and post-conditions together with the participants. The
participants did not need much facilitation in order to understand and provide
information to complete parts of T-UC. For the pre- and post-conditions there
were some changes after a discussion on what it actually expected. Another T-
UC named receive radio message was filled fast by reusing the information from
the transmit radio message T-UC. While filling the exception path of the former
T-UC, we noticed that the participants began to discuss and give information on
failures of different components of the system, and we commented that we would
look into this while going through the safety MUC and FSD. There was some
confusion related to alternative paths and exception paths. Moreover, exception
paths were perceived as a part of T-UC where failures could be documented.
1.3 Safety assessment
D-MUC: The safety D-MUC session produced three misuse cases: communica-
tion failure, double transmission and interference. A flip over was used to draw
the D-MUC and the photo of the resulting safety D-MUC is shown in Figure 1.
This part of the case study took about 17 minutes.
The first misuse case communication failure was identified through a discus-
sion of how to interpret the guideword late together with the use case transmit.
Based on the discussion about the possibilities of delays in their system, it was
suggested to use the guideword “no” instead to fit with the identified misuse
case communication failure. The participants discussed technical details about
the communication system, i.e., the protocol the system would have to use in or-
der to have a delay. Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier raised a question about
the abstraction level of the communication channel, which was answered by
Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and confirmed by us to be at a higher ab-
straction level. The communication channel (CC) is drawn as the misactor in
the D-MUC.
We further facilitated the D-MUC session by asking for more failures and the
next misuse case double transmission was suggested by Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier.
He explained that this misuse case has the same effect as communication fail-
ure, but that it cannot be mitigated so easily. A discussion followed on whether
the double transmission misuse case threatens both the transmit and the receive
UCs. First, Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier
agreed that it threatens both. However, after drawing the line indicating that it
also threatens the transmit UC and moving on to identify other misuse cases,
Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier returned to the drawn D-MUC and stated
that it only threatens the receive UC. We agreed taking a whole system view
and that in such a view the double transmission would threaten both UCs. The
air-traffic control officer (ATCO) and flight crew (FC) were identified as the
possible causes.
The last misuse case interference was identified after we referred to the guide-
word “no” again and combined it with the receive UC. Details on the cause for
interference were given and drawn as a misactor.
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Fig. 1. The created safety D-MUC by use of the guideword “no”.
Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier commented on the abstraction level of
the MUC; there were many causes for communication failure and it made sense
not to further break it down at this stage. There was a short discussion on which
misuse case to use for further safety assessment. Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier
argued that the double transmission was the most critical, as it would be harder
to detect and mitigate. Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier did point out that
there were several other communication failures that could go undetected and
therefore are critical. But, it was agreed to use the double transmission for the
further safety assessment.
T-MUC: The next step in the safety assessment was to use the T-MUC to detail
the misuse case double transmission. Because of time constraints, only the most
essential part of the T-MUC was filled. In Table 2 the resulting T-MUC is shown.
As seen in the Table 2, the T-MUC details the misuse case drawn in the
safety D-MUC. However, the T-MUC was not filled right after the D-MUC
session because it was suggested to switch to the FSD. During the FSD session,
we recorded some information in parallel in the T-MUC, but then involved the
participants after the FSD session to confirm the collected information and to
fill the remaining fields. The total time used to discuss the T-MUC and then fill
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Name Double transmission
. . . . . .
Basic path bp1. flight crew and air-traffic control officer initiate the trans-
mitting at the same time
bp2. Other flight crew might receive the double transmission
bp3. flight crew and air-traffic control officer releases the trans-
mitting button at the same time
Mitigation points mp1. If another flight crew hears double transmission and makes
air-traffic control officer/flight crew aware of the double trans-
mission
mp2. If double transmission happens less than specific
timeframe, receiver recognizes it and informs the voice-
communication system.
mp3. Procedure for re-transmit after a certain amount of time
Assumptions as1. In bp1: Same length of transmission
as2. In bp1: Communication channel is simplex
as3. In mp2: double transmission does not happen at same time
(resolution of some miliseconds)
Preconditions preC1. flight crew and air-traffic control officer ready to transmit
on the same time
Postconditions postC1. The air-traffic control officer and flight crew not aware
of the double transmission
Misuser profile air-traffic control officer and flight crew (communication chan-
nel)
Authors Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-
RadioSystemsSupplier
Date 27.03.2012
Table 2. The safety T-MUC for double transmission from the RadioSystems case.
out the fields was 27 minutes. However, it should be kept in mind that parts of
the T-MUC was filled during the FSD session.
A few corrections were made to the already collected information. The par-
ticipants used their domain knowledge to point out that a second aircraft could
hear a double transmission, as amplified modulation of the VHF (very-high fre-
quency) signal will give a tone and the message, as opposed to FM (frequency
modulation), where one will not hear or recognize such a tone and message. This
was then recorded as the first mitigation in the mitigation point field in Table 2.
We also observed how new assumptions were identified and recorded during
the discussion about mitigations. There was also a discussion whether the miti-
gation for detecting the double transmission could lead to new hazards, and false
alarms were mentioned by Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and discussed by
Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier.
As the misuser profile field had not been used for safety before, we had
problems relating it to the components, actors or misactors from the D-MUC
and FSD. Because of time limitations, we decided to move on with filling the
HAZOP table.
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Fig. 2. The FSD representing the double transmission from the RadioSystems case.
FSD: The FSD session resulted in one FSD, which is shown in Figure 2. The
session was partly facilitated by Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier, after we had
facilitated the transition from D-MUC to FSD by drawing the air-traffic control
officer (ATCO) and the flight crew (FC) as actors and communication channel
(CC) as the system component on the flip over. This part of the case study
lasted for about 12 minutes.
Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier was not sure whether to use the black or
red color markers for drawing in the activation boxes and messages. However,
when Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier was helped to draw the first activation
boxes and messages on the FSD, he started using the FSD to explain concur-
rency of the transmissions from air-traffic control officer and flight crew. He also
facilitated a discussion on how it could be detected.
Although the FSD was a simple example, it was not easy for Informant-1-
RadioSystemsSupplier to draw the FSD. He was not familiar with the idea that
time is represented downward in the diagram, by the lifeline of the components.
Furthermore, he did not naturally think of using the red color to mark where












































































Table 3. The HAZOP table created in the RadioSystems case.
However, Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier used the FSD to facilitate a
discussion that gave new details on the double transmission. The FSD gave a
good reference to discuss the misuse case and to represent the concurrency. In
a discussion of whether to use the FSD at a more detailed level, Informant-2-
RadioSystemsSupplier suggested splitting the FSD into a higher-level diagram
for the consequences and a more detaile diagram for the causes. We suggested
recordi g the new details of the double transmission scenario in the safety T-
MUC.
HAZOP table: The final part of the safety assessment was to extract informa-
tion for the HAZOP table, which resulted in Table 33. Parts of the information
had already been filled in the T-MUC and could be referred to, e.g., Recomm.
(recommendation) in HAZOP referring to the mitigation point field in T-MUC.
However, some clarifications were needed in order to specify the consequence,
cause and hazard. In particular, we discussed that the hazard must be specified
as a scenario at a higher level, in which the radio system is embedded in a larger
ATM system.
Summary of safety assessment in the RadioSystems case: For the D-MUC, the
participants initially we t into technical details, but that they later realized
that the technique should be used at a higher abstraction level at that stage
of the safety assessment. The guideword helped the participan s o brainstorm
for hazards and three misuse cases were identified in 17 minutes. No mitigations
were drawn (Figure 1), but some initial ideas on mitigation emerging during the
discussions.
The mitigation idea became more concrete in the FSD. Still, no mitigations
were drawn in the FSD. Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier partly facilitated
the session; whereas he created good discussions by using the FSD as reference,
explaining his and others’ ideas, he did not succeed well in drawing the FSD.
There was also a discussion about the level of detail in the FSD, and it was rec-
ognized that one could break the FSD down into a more detailed FSD. However,
the FSD allowed discussing more details on concurrency, which we recognized
as a break down of the misuse case at a lower abstraction level.
3 The Risk and Comments column was removed to save space, as they were not used.
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In the T-MUC, the concrete mitigation idea from the FSD was recorded
as a mitigation point. The T-MUC was well suited to record the ideas from
the discussions taking part during the D-MUC and, in particular, FSD sessions.
Furthermore, assumptions were made both during the FSD and T-MUC sessions,
and recording these in the T-MUC was seen as important to the participants
and us.
Although the T-MUC collected and structured the information from the FSD
and partly from D-MUC, the HAZOP table was useful for extracting the more
general information, such as the consequence and hazard the double transmission
could create. For the recommendation on how to avoid or treat the hazard, the
mitigation points from the T-MUC could directly be referenced in the HAZOP
table.
We noticed that the flow of information and ideas between the techniques
was working well in the safety assessment. Although time was limited, hazards
were identified and analyzed from different view points and abstraction levels.
The overall time spent for the safety assessment was 1 hour and 4 minutes.
This included creating D-MUC, T-MUC, HAZOP table and FSD. Most time
was spent on creating the T-MUC.
1.4 Security assessment
D-MUC: Security assessment started with the security D-MUC. When initiating
the session, Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier listed some of the HAZOP guide-
word before they were shown with the projector to the participants. We chose
the guideword “other” for the session and in combination with the UCs trans-
mit (Tr.) and receive (Rec.), the three misuse cases simulating air-traffic control
officer, initiating double transmission (regularly) and block normal communica-
tion were created. These three misuse cases were investigated for confidentiality,
integrity and availability (CIA), which resulted in more detailed information for
each of the three misuse cases. The result of applying the security D-MUC is
shown in Figure 3. For this part of the case study, we used about 23 minutes.
For the D-MUC, Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier took an attacker point
of view when he suggested that the attacker has an own communication system
and directs it towards the flight crew. Furthermore, Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier
continues with the thought of an attacker is attacking from a remote location,
communicating with the flight crew without being recognized by the air-traffic
control officer. The D-MUC starts out like a scenario and not like a higher-level
threat against the UCs. When the participants are asked to associate the at-
tack with the guideword, Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier suggests that the
attacker pretends being the air-traffic control officer and associates it with the
integrity attribute of the CIA triad. The participants brainstorm for how an
attacker can block the communication to and from the air-traffic control offi-
cer and many ideas were created and associated with the CIA triad and other
guidewords, such as “no”. This brainstorming session resulted in the misuse cases
simulating air-traffic control officer and initiating double transmission regularly.
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Fig. 3. The security D-MUC from the RadioSystems case.
The participants were asked which UCs the two identified misuse cases threat-
ens, as they have not been associated with the UCs yet. Then Informant-2-
RadioSystemsSupplier uses the guideword “other” and relates it to a scenario
where somebody has access to the system from inside, which may allow block-
ing the air-traffic control officer and accessing the system directly. An insider
is suggested as misactor and drawn together with the misuse case blocks nor-
mal communication to the D-MUC. Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier joins the
idea and the two participants brainstorm how this could happen. At some stage
in the brainstorming they stop and reflect on all the assumptions they have
made for the scenario. Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier continues elaborating
on the scenario, but suggests that the knowledge and means needed by an insider
would make the scenario impossible. Finally, Informant-2-RadioSystemsSupplier
states that the scenario is becoming quite complex and it is suggested to move
on with the MUSD.
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Fig. 4. The MUSD where an outsider is simulating the air-traffic control officer from
the RadioSystems case.
In this session, the participants created the D-MUC faster and understood
and adapted the technique better. The participants quickly adapted the at-
tacheds mindset and contributed many ideas along the way.
T-MUC: Due to time limitations, it was agreed with the participants that the
MUSD should be prioritized instead of making the T-MUC.
MUSD: We thus proceeded to explore use of the MUSD based on a scenario
where an outsider simulating the air-traffic control officer was chosen based on
the previous identified misuse case simulating air-traffic control officer. In the
resulting MUSD session the focus was to facilitate a good discussion by using
the MUSD technique. With the time limitations in mind it was agreed that a
MUSD would only be sketched in the session and then completed by the authors
after the session, to be sent and reviewed by the participants. The completed
MUSD is shown in Figure 4. Time limitations did not allow using more than 10
minutes on this part.
The main actors and components involved in the scenario were sketched
up in the MUSD. Both Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier and Informant-2-
RadioSystemsSupplier took the attacker point of view, and they got involved
in elaborating on how an outsider would simulate the air-traffic control officer,
and at the same time avoid the air-traffic control officer noticing or being able to
take back control of the situation. However, they also elaborated on mitigations,
such as how an air-traffic control officer would be able to detect such a scenario
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and his possibilities of regaining control. The participants outlined a complete
scenario, by building on each others ideas.
Summary of security assessment in the RadioSystems case: For the security D-
MUC, the participants were taking the attackers point of view and elaborating
on a scenario where an attacker is simulating the air-traffic control officer and
blocking normal communication between the air-traffic control officer and the
flight crew. The HAZOP guidewords worked well for security, and the CIA triad
gave some more detailed ideas on what the attacker would do in the scenario. At
some stage of the brainstorming, the participants stated that the scenario was
becoming complex, which created a natural transition to MUSD.
The MUSD was used to facilitate the discussion with detailed focus on how
an attacker could simulate the air-traffic control officer, thereby continuing the
scenario from the D-MUC. The participants still took the attackers point of
view, built on each others ideas and brought in elements from the D-MUC for
further elaboration. At this stage they also identified possible mitigations.
Less time was spent on security than on safety assessment, about 35 minutes
in total. Most time was spent on the security D-MUC. T-MUC was skipped. For
the MUSD, there was not enough time to draw the diagram in detail.
1.5 Summary of the Radio Systems Case Study
For the use of the techniques, the participants understanding of techniques im-
proved during the security assessments when compared to safety assessments.
Whereas some time was used for the participants to understand the elements of
each technique in the safety assessment, the use of techniques was more straight-
forward for the security assessment. It became particularly clear when starting
the security D-MUC, where Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier listed some of
the HAZOP guidewords before they were shown with the projector to the par-
ticipants. Although we did not use the same guidewords for safety and security
D-MUCs, we recognized that the participants related the guideword for security
more easily to the UCs than the case was for the safety D-MUC. Also for the
MUSD, their skills in modeling improved compared to FSD. We do, however,
not consider this as a valid result as Informant-1-RadioSystemsSupplier drew
the FSD whereas we drew the MUSD.
Their knowledge of the system and possible failures from the safety assess-
ment was reused as vulnerabilities in the security assessment. The participants
reused their knowledge of the double transmission from the safety assessment
in the security attack scenario. Since they had already built a common under-
standing of the system, the discussions during the security assessment were more
focused on the security parts. Also the double transmission detection, which was
discussed as mitigation in the safety assessment, was brought into the security
assessment as one way to detect the threat scenarios created by security D-MUC
and MUSD.
We did not observe any confusion among the participants regarding separat-
ing the safety and security assessments. When the participants reused knowledge
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from the safety to the security assessment, they also translated the knowledge
into a security setting.
2 The Airport Lights Case
2.1 Participants
In this case the three participants took part in all the activities (a fourth person
was also present in parts of the sessions, but he was only observing without
interfering and has not been included in the data collection). We will refer to
them as Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier, Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier
and Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier.
Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier, Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier and Informant-
5-AirportLightsSupplier had 22, 20 and 10 years of working experience from the
IT industry. They were all experienced in safety assessments, but had less practi-
cal experience with security assessments. Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier was
experienced in HAZOP, while Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier had tried it
and Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier had heard about it. Both Informant-4-
AirportLightsSupplier and Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier had tried model-
ing with SD, whereas Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier was experienced in SD.
However, none of the participants were experienced in modeling with UC and
only Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier claimed to have some experience with
UML.
2.2 Advance-prepared UC and an updated SD
Because the system contained too many functions to model in the evaluation
session, the authors decided to only model the control of airport lights. The first
author modeled UC and SD of the system function based on his experiences
from ATM in general, and from doing safety assessments of such a system in
particular.
The advance-prepared D-UC, T-UC and SD of their system were presented
to the participants in order to collect feedback on the realism and to change the
incorrect parts.
SD: As shown in the photo of the projected SD in Figure 5, some changes were
made to the SD.
When going through and correcting the SD, they easily understood the SD
and were directly able to recognize their system and discuss the interactions.
They immediately noticed that we had misunderstood their system configura-
tion, which we errouneously had taken to include the servers. One of the partic-
ipants stated that “it is a very good example and it is very easy to see how it
works” when going through, discussing and correcting the SD. We asked whether
the specific SD was clear to them and if it provided a good way to display and




































Fig. 5. SD in AirportLights case corrected by the participants. (RWY-LGT: Runway
Lights, PLC: Programmable-Logic Controller, APCN: Airport Communication Net-
work)
the participants discussed and corrected each others understanding of the sys-
tem. The participants started discussing how their system could fail, and that
SD provided a good starting point for failure analysis.
T-UC: For the T-UC, it was not that easy to relate SD and T-UC. The facilitator
had to remind the participants of what the alternative path was about and the
secreta y had to rite the al ernative path example without much contribution
from the pa ticipants. As the T-UC was used by the facilitator to summarize
the discussion of the participants from the SD session, the participants did not
contributing much with information.
2.3 Safety assessment
The safety assessment was started right after finishing the T-UC, by displaying
the D-UC with a projector and presenting the guidewords to the participants.
About 1 hour and 6 minutes were spent on the safety assessment part.
D-MUC: As shown in Figure 6, the D-UC are displayed with a projector to the
left in the photo, whereas the corresponding D-MUC is drawn by hand and shown
to the right. Two D-MUCs were created in this part of the safety assessment,
which lasted for about 26 minutes. The first D-MUC took about 15 minutes to
create and the second D-MUC about 10 minutes.
The guideword “no” and “late” were used to develop two D-MUCs, after some
initial discussions about the guidewords. Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier sug-
gested using the guideword “fails”. Furthermore, “other” and “slow” guidewords
were discussed instead of the “late”.
The misuse cases no adjustment of runway lights and delayed adjustment of
runway lights were quickly identified and agreed upon. However, the participants
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Fig. 6. Advance-prepared D-UC and created D-MUC for the guideword late in the
AirportLights case.
also came up with conditions for the misuse cases, e.g., low visibility at an airport
and the final approach phase for aircraft landing at the airport. Furthermore, the
participants also explored different scenarios of not being able to adjust runway
lights when they were at high intensity or low intensity. Domain knowledge was
used to discuss the operating procedure for the air-traffic control officer adjusting
runway lights and for aircraft in case no adjustment would be possible. The
participants also used system knowledge when an “auto-lights” function was
identified and discussed for relevance to the adjustment of runway lights.
Many potential causes for the two misuse cases were identified, which were
put as misactors in the D-MUCs. It was also discussed at which level the misac-
tors should be. They identified many parts of the architecture as misactors, and
that they became more detailed in identifying causes, e.g., software and hard-
ware faults. Furthermore, the participants discussed how it could happen that
the air-traffic control officer would not be able to adjust runway lights. This was
taken further in the second misuse case (delayed adjustment of runway lights),
when the participants discussed the human-machine interface and how a delay
of adjusting runway lights might affect the behavior of the air-traffic control
officer. The participants also came up with a performance requirement from a
standard.
T-MUC: Because of time limitations, there was no T-MUC created in the Air-
portLights case. However, there was a discussion on whether to continue with
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Fig. 7. The resulting FSD from the safety assessment in the AirportLights case.
FSD or T-MUC after the D-MUC session. We asked the participants to let us
know their opinion on what they preferred and why. For T-MUC it was argued
by Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier that was believed to be better if one were
alone, to write down the steps of D-MUC. He did, however, believe that FSD
would be better suited in a group setting. Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier ar-
gued that T-MUC would give more information. After a vote it is decided by
the participants to continue with the FSD. However, due to the time limitations
we did write T-MUC.
FSD: There was one FSD created during the safety assessment, which was partly
facilitated by Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier, who was experienced in SD
and safety assessment as described in Section 2.1. A photo of the resulting FSD
is shown in Figure 7. This part of the case study took about 33 minutes.
As shown in Figure 7, the notation for the FSD (right part) was drawn
on the whiteboard before Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier started facilitating
the safety assessment with the FSD. In short, the FSD was created through the
following steps:
1. Drawing and discussing the actors, system components and their interactions
2. Identifying the failure in the system for the scenario
3. Drawing the failure and analyzing the failures effect in the system and on
the actors
4. Identifying mitigations for the failure and discussing both failure and miti-
gations for effectiveness
The resulting FSD in Figure 7 represents the scenario of delayed adjustment of
runway lights.
We supported Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier in the initial drawing of the
SD, i.e., how to represent the air-traffic control officer, network and the lifeline
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with activation for the components. However, after some initial explanations,
Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier facilitated a good discussion on what com-
ponents to include and how these interact in the system. All participants got
involved in detailing the system, and they added on each others explanations
while discussing. After being helped to draw the failure, we witnessed that the
participants discussed several aspects of the failure, considering how the system
would react and what the different actors would do if they would recognize the
failure. They also considered environmental and operational settings, combining
these settings into various scenarios.
All participants were involved in elaborating on the details about the failure
and systems reaction. The causes for the failure were discussed, and some of
the causes identified earlier in the safety D-MUC were used in the discussions.
Mitigations were identified and analyzed in parallel with the failure, considering
mitigations by the system and the actors.
The participants used FSD more than D-MUC during the discussions. More
often, they referred to the components drawn on the whiteboard, in particu-
lar when discussing details about the failures and mitigations in the system.
Whereas Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier was mainly contributing in the dis-
cussions about the system and internal failures, Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier
was more active in providing domain knowledge of the environment and actors
involved. Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier took part in and facilitated both
types of discussions. At several occasions Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier pointed
out assumptions that were made, in particular when elaborating on reactions
from actors involved in the FSD.
Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier summarized the use of FSD as “a very
good way to discuss” and “go into the details and find out what is really how
the system works.” The participants agreed that FSD would be a good means
to facilitate discussions with other stakeholders, for example air-traffic control
officer and flight crew, not part of the safety assessment, in order to analyze the
scenario further.
Summary of safety assessment in the AirportLights case: The FSD part of safety
assessment was partly facilitated by the Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier. In
the safety D-MUC session, the participants were able to suggest many causes
for the misuse cases. The participants quickly adopted an operational mindset
(about air traffic control situations), narrowing the scenario down to a specific
phase of operation and bringing in environmental effects, such as weather and
time of day as factors.
It was possible to create a scenario with FSD that corresponded to one of
the safety D-MUC. The participants reused their understanding created during
the safety D-MUC session in the FSD session. In particular, they reused domain
knowledge of environmental and operating conditions.
Only one cause of failure was used in the FSD, whereas in the safety D-MUC
many causes were identified. However, we noted that the causes identified with
D-MUC were on different level of abstraction. If more FSDs had been created,
more causes would have been identified and modeled.
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We also observed that many of the discussions during the D-MUC and FSD
sessions brought up information that could have been directly recorded in the
T-MUC fields, such as pre-conditions about weather, time of the day and flight
phase, assumptions about air-traffic control officer and flight crew operations,
stakeholders and the risks involved. This points in the direction of using T-MUC
in parallel in these sessions to record the information given by the participants,
so that it is not lost. Just a few things were recorded in the D-MUC and FSD, but
compared to T-MUC they did not facilitate the recording of such information
well.
A total of 1 hour and 6 minutes was spent on safety assessment. Most time
was spent on the FSD.
2.4 Security assessment
D-MUC: Two security misuse cases were created in this first part of the security
assessment, shown in Figure 8. The two misuse cases were created using the
guideword “other”. They were similar to each other as both considered an insider
controlling the runway lights. Whereas the first misuse case was providing the
notion of an insider controlling the runway lights from an airfield lighting control
substation4, the second misuse case considered how the runway lights could be
controlled through the airport computer network. The misuse cases were created
in less than 10 minutes.
There was no confusion about the security D-MUC activity, even though
a different guideword was suggested and short time was used to explain the
guideword and how to proceed. However, there was a slight confusion for the
guidephrase, as the guideword “other” and the use case could be combined in
three ways: (1) other adjustment of runway lights, (2) adjustment other runway
lights and (3) adjustment of runway lights other. Each of them gave different
associations; the resulting misuse case was formed as a combination of the first
and last guidephrases.
The participants did contribute with information that could have been struc-
tured with a T-MUC. They gave information about the preconditions for an at-
tack, the misuser profile by stating needed technical equipment and knowledge.
Furthermore, the participants were discussing about other possible scenarios,
e.g., how an insider could enter the airport and get access to the airfield lighting
from the sub-stations and alternative ways of getting access to the runway lights
through the airport computer network.
T-MUC: Because of time limitations, there was no T-MUC created for the
security assessment in the AirportLights case. However, it was observed that
several of the fields contained in a T-MUC could have been used to record and
structure the information given about the misuses described with D-MUC and
MUSD.
4 The sub-station is on the airfield and provides direct access to controlling the various
taxiway and runway lights on the airport.
18
Fig. 8. The security D-MUC created in the AirportLights case. (TWR: TOWER, NET:
NETWORK)
MUSD: Both misuse cases were further described or explored with MUSD, but
the misuse case where an insider is controlling the runway lights from the sub-
stations was given most focus and time. We did, however, observe that the
participants were able to quickly and easily make the second MUSD, by adapt-
ing the information from the first MUSD to the second misuse case. About 19
minutes were spent on the MUSD.
Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier took the role as the facilitator and drew
both MUSDs. The initial discussion with the MUSD was how and where the
insider would access the airfield lighting system. The next step was to draw the
components between the access point and the actual runway lights, where they
already had a clear idea of the components involved. Thereafter, a discussion
followed about the insider preventing the air-traffic control officer from interven-
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Fig. 9. The first MUSD drawn in the AirportLights case. (AFL NW: Airfield Light
Network, PLC: Programmable-Logic Controller)
ing in shutting off the runway lights. Furthermore, there was a brief discussion
on other light systems at the airport, and the possibility of the insider attacking
the stop-bar lights5 as well as the runway lights. Because of time constraints, we
asked the participants to concentrate on the simpler scenario with only runway
lights involved.
They used the same environmental and operational conditions as for the
FSD, and that these were written on the whiteboard as the interaction sequence
from the insider was drawn. They did, however, add new domain knowledge
into the discussions, e.g., different types of aircraft involved, the combinations
of attacking the integrated landing system as well as the runway lights and other
weather conditions such as strong side winds. Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier
brought in domain knowledge about the most critical period of the flight phase6.
There was a slight confusion when drawing the messages, whether black or
red color should be used, especially when drawing the last message, going from
lights to flight crew, as shown in Figure 9. The participants questioned whether
this was normal system behavior, and we discussed that on the one hand it is
allowed system behavior, but on the other hand it should somehow be marked
that the harm can happen.
At some stage of the discussion the participants also elaborated on possible
mitigations, e.g., how the air-traffic control officer could notice that the runway
lights would be turned off. They took the attacker point of view and came up
with new attacker steps to avoid that the air-traffic control officer could interfere
or how the runway lights could be turned off without the air-traffic control officer
noticing.
Summary of security assessment in the AirportLights case: During the security
D-MUC session, the generation of misuse cases was very dependent on the way
the UC is phrased and how the guideword is applied with UC. We see the
5 Stop-bar lights are used at the holding point before entering the airport. The air-
traffic control officer uses it as a safety barrier, to prevent an aircraft from taxiing
out on the runway, e.g., for take-off while another aircraft is landing on the same
runway.
6 It was stated to be the last 10 seconds before touch down on the runway.
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potential for guidephrase generation, e.g., a list of the different combinations of
guidewords and UC phrases. This could be automatic if ontologies are used. It
could add to the completeness of the D-MUC modeling security.
In the transition from D-MUC to MUSD, the focus was put on how an at-
tacker could access the airfield lighting system. The D-MUC session was kept at
a higher abstraction level, as the participants were discussing the capabilities of
an attacker and were he could attack. The MUSD was facilitated by Informant-
3-AirportLightsSupplier and the participants came of up with several ideas for
relevant operational and environmental factors. In the MUSD session the dis-
cussion were at a lower abstraction level, but at the same time the threat to the
aircraft was put forward, which is at a higher abstraction level.
Just as for the safety assessment there was not enough time to use T-MUC,
but much information was given during the D-MUC and MUSD sessions that
could have been recorded in the T-MUC fields.
For the security assessment only 34 minutes were used. The MUSD session
was the longest session during the security assessment sessions.
2.5 Summary of the Airport Lights Case Study
The participants reused many of the ideas from the safety assessment for the se-
curity assessment. The scenarios created by the participants, in particular during
the FSD session, gave a common understanding, which was used in both safety
and security assessments. In particular we noticed that they reused knowledge
of the system, the domain, functionality, components, environment and assump-
tions. Although the interconnectivity of the airfield lighting system was the main
aspect for the safety assessment, the network of the airfield lighting system be-
came more important during the security assessment, and the participants gave
more details when describing it.
In the security assessment, the participants knew what to do when using the
techniques. Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier continued to facilitate with the
MUSD technique, so there was a learning effect from safety part, in particular
from the FSD. Furthermore, they seemed to more naturally align to the scope of
assessment and limitations, what to discuss and not, when applying the security
assessment.
They were able to distinguish the safety part from the security part. We
did, however, observe that Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier once mentioned
an example of a malicious act against the air-traffic control officer in the safety
assessment part. This seemed more as a comment than a suggestion of cause and
it was not followed up on, neither by us nor by Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier
in the post-study questionnaire.
3 Replies to the post-study questionnaire
The questions were sent to the participants after the sessions and returned
in a few days. Four participants answered the questions, whereas participant
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Informant-4-AirportLightsSupplier replied that he did not have time to give any
answers. The questionnaire had two parts:
The first part contained 24 statements that we asked the participants to rank
on a Likert-like scale ranging from 1—strongly disagree to 5—strongly agree.
Table 4 shows the answers. The grey-marked questions in the questionnaire
were concerned with issues that we did not introduce the participants to or have
time for during the case study. We gave them the option of leaving them blank
or, if they liked, they could give us their opinion of how they think it would,
i.e., if they would have been introduced to it. When the statements were not
ranked/left blank, we have put the participant(s) in the NA (“Not Answered”)
column to the right.
The section part contained 8 open-ended questions to the participants to al-
low them detailing their experiences with CHASSIS. The participants from the
RadioSystemsSupplier chose to give their common answers, while Informant-3-
AirportLightsSupplier and Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier answered the ques-
tions individually.
3.1 Ranking of statements
Of the issues we had introduced the participants to, they agreed most strongly
that CHASSIS facilitated discussions and common understanding among partic-
ipants. They also supported the statements that it was easy to familiarize with
CHASSIS both from a safety and a security background, that it was efficient
to work with the method, and that they would consider to use CHASSIS again
in the future. None of the issues we had introduced the participants to received
negative scores, although Informant-5-AirportLights was neutral (score 3) on 5
of the issues (while positive, score 4 or 5, on the rest).
Among the issues we did not have the time to introduce the participants too,
the two who rated it both disagreed with the statement that the complexity of
a combined safety and security assessment is higher compared to two separate
assessments whose results are combined at the final step of requirements analysis.
3.2 Answers to questions
Asked about the strengths of CHASSIS, The participants from the RadioSys-
temsSupplier found the method easy to understand, to which Informant-3-
AirportLightsSupplier added ease of use. The participants from the RadioSys-
temsSupplier also mentioned that the visual approach makes it easy to dis-
cuss and to distribute knowledge to others. Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier
agreed that the visualization of safety and secrity risks makes it easy for par-
ticipants to understand and to participate in discussion. Considering what they
liked about CHASSIS, Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier liked that it presented
both graphical and textual information of system to be analyzed. The diagrams
were good to show during discussions. Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier liked
the sequence diagrams.
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Table 4. Answers to statement with a five point scale (from 1—strongly disagree to
5—strongly agree, RS: RadioSystemsSuppliers, AL: AirportLightsSupplier).
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When asked about the weaknesses of CHASSIS, The participants from the
RadioSystemsSupplier wondered whether the diagram notations might become
too complex for some cases, leading to loss of overview. Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier
was not convinced that CHASSIS was a better way to trap risks and hazards than
conventional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). Asked what he disliked
about CHASSIS, Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier explained that the method
did not did not seem to ensure that one really finds all the safety/security risks.
Therefore, the method should perhaps be based more explicitly on the require-
ments list, and then all the requirements with any relation to safety/security
should be considered. The risks should also be classified, so that all are listed,
but only those that will have any impact are analyzed.
Concerning the disadvantages of combining safety and security assessments,
The participants from the RadioSystemsSupplier answered that the result might
be too complex for complicated cases.
When asked about other issues that could not be easily fit into CHASSIS,
Informant-5-AirportLightsSupplier mentioned that safety and security elements
that concerns other suppliers systems should also be noted and addressed. The
“big picture” is important.
Finally, we asked the participants about the pros and cons of integrating
CHASSIS into their existing development processes. The participants from the
RadioSystemsSupplier thought that it will be a good idea to implement CHAS-
SIS into the system development process. Since their products are usually em-
bedded in more complex systems, it would be useful to do a complete analysis
of the voice-communication system to evaluate and get assessments for all the
various components. In this way it would be possible for their customer (the air-
navigation service provider) to specify the correct safety and security level for
the components. The participants from the AirportLightsSupplier were also posi-
tive. Informant-3-AirportLightsSupplier would like to acquire a tool for analyzing
security, which was also integrated in the same process as safety Informant-5-
AirportLightsSupplier mentioned the “great outputs”, especially the diagrams,
which would help document their safety and security assessments. At the same
time, he cautioned that CHASSIS would need to be implemented in a way that
keeps the process effective and sensible, probably by merging with other existing
system analysis exercises. Otherwise it might become too time consuming and
thus de-motivating.
